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Law & Social Inquiry
Volume 40, Issue 1, 51-85, Winter 2015
The Questionable Character of the Bar's
Character and Fitness Inquiry
Leslie C. Levin, Christine Zozula, and Peter Siegelman
Lawyers who engage in misconduct can do substantial harm. To screen out "unfit"
lawyers, bar examining authorities collect detailed personal information from bar appli-
cants. The rationale for this "character and fimess" inquiry is to identify who is likely to
become a problematic lawyer. Despite the history of discrimination associated with this
inquiry and the highly personal information requested, there has been no rigorous test of
whether such predictions are possible. This article examines the information disclosed by
1,343 Connecticut bar applicants and their subsequent disciplinary records. It reveals that
while some bar application data are associated with an elevated risk of future discipline, the
predictive power of the data is extremely low. Moreover, several variables are more strongly
associated with less severe discipline than with more severe discipline. We argue that some
of the causal mechanisms linking application data to subsequent discipline may have more
to do with career trajectory than with an underlying propensity to engage in misconduct.
INTRODUCTION
Lawyers occupy positions of power and trust in society. When they engage in
misconduct, their actions not only hurt vulnerable clients and third parties, but also
undermine public confidence in the legal profession and the administration of justice.
In an effort to reduce the likelihood that such harm will occur, every state bar scrutinizes
bar applicants' "moral character and fitness" to practice law (NCBE and ABA 2013, vii,
4-5). To demonstrate good character, bar applicants are required to provide detailed
information about their backgrounds, including any prior unlawful conduct, academic
misconduct, neglect of financial responsibilities, and psychological history. The assump-
tion underlying the inquiry is that "from [such] evidence ... of past misconduct, bar
examiners will be able to predict future behavior accurately enough to justify denying
some applicants the chance to practice law" (Clarke 1995, 59).
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The requirement that applicants seeking to become lawyers possess "good charac-
ter" is rooted in the "professional project" (Larson 1977, 49; Gordon 2002), that is, the
effort by lawyers to attain market monopoly, social status, and autonomy. The character
requirement was historically used by the organized bar to exclude whole classes of
individuals from the bar for reasons unrelated to their fitness to practice (Auerbach
1976; Abel 1989). Today, the stated purpose of the good character requirement is to
protect both the public and the administration of justice by ensuring that only indi-
viduals who possess the requisite character and fitness are admitted to the bar (NCBE
and ABA 2013, vii). Theorists also believe that the character inquiry serves to bolster
the legal profession's reputation with the public and to maintain its status and preroga-
tives as a profession (Rhode 1985; Abel 1989; Cunningham 1992; Woolley 2007).
Surprisingly, however, it is unclear whether the data gathered during the character
inquiry actually predict lawyer misconduct. The questions are not derived from-nor
have they ever been validated using-psychological assessment tools and it is unclear
what they actually measure. The process itself imposes nontrivial time and monetary
costs on both applicants and bar authorities and impinges on applicants' privacy. The
character and fitness requirement may also deter some people who would be good
lawyers from pursing that career. Thus, it is important to understand which-if any-of
the data being collected are actually useful in predicting future misconduct.
There have been no studies that validate the accuracy of predictions based on the
information collected from bar applicants. This article reports on the first study that
systematically examines whether the information revealed during the bar application
process can be used to predict the likelihood that an applicant will be disciplined later
in his or her legal career. In this study, we reviewed the admissions records of 1,343
lawyers admitted to the Connecticut bar from 1989-1992 and their subsequent disci-
plinary history (if any). The data reveal that many of the responses on the admissions
application are statistically associated with discipline risk.' Higher law school grades,
attendance at a more prestigious law school, and being female significantly decrease the
likelihood of discipline; having delinquent credit accounts, having been a party to civil
litigation (excluding divorce), higher student loan debt, more traffic violations, and a
history of a diagnosis of or treatment for psychological disorders increase it. These
variables nevertheless make very poor predictors of subsequent discipline. The expla-
nation for this seeming paradox is that the overall baseline likelihood of discipline is so
low (only about 2.5 percent). Thus, even if some variable (e.g., having defaulted on a
student loan) doubles the likelihood of subsequent disciplinary action-a very strong
effect-the probability of subsequent discipline for an applicant with a student loan
default is still only 5 percent.
The low predictive power of the character and fitness inquiry raises some important
questions. To the extent that particular measures on the character and fitness inquiry are
at all predictive of lawyer discipline, through what mechanism are those effects realized?
Do the questions measure a propensity to offend, or do they predict lawyer discipline
through other mediating factors, such as career trajectory? Do the low predictive value
1. We stress that our analysis throughout should be understood as predictive, rather than causal. Our
data and methods do not allow us to say why some of our independent variables are associated with a higher
risk of discipline. We do, however, offer some possible explanations for our findings in the Discussion section.
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and uncertain deterrent effects of the character and fitness questions outweigh their
costs? And if not, should bar regulators consider alternative means either to reduce the
likelihood of lawyer misconduct or to mitigate the harm caused by problem lawyers?
THE CHARACTER AND FITNESS INQUIRY
Process
The official character and fitness inquiry typically begins at the end of law school,
when an applicant seeks admission to a state bar.' It is usually conducted by a bar
examining authority (or a "character and fitness" committee) that operates under the
supervision of the state court. Applicants complete a lengthy form that reveals detailed
information about past conduct, and they may also be required to produce substantiat-
ing documentation, including driving records, credit histories, and character references.
Law schools also contribute information about their graduates' conduct and academic
performance. The application file is then reviewed by the bar examining authority. A
character and fitness hearing may be triggered by prior unlawful conduct, academic
misconduct, neglect of financial responsibilities, substance dependency, and prior psy-
chological problems, among other things (NCBE and ABA 2013, viii).
The moral character inquiry ostensibly seeks to determine "whether the present
character and fitness of an applicant qualifies the applicant for admission" (NCBE and
ABA 2013, viii-ix). In most states, past unlawful conduct merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that an applicant lacks the requisite character to practice law (Swisher
2008). Bar examining authorities look at a variety of factors when considering past
misconduct, including the seriousness and recency of the misconduct, the cumulative
effect of the conduct, and evidence of rehabilitation (NCBE and ABA 2013, ix). The
applicant's expressions of remorse and candor in the application process are considered
important evidence of rehabilitation (Rhode 1985; Hoener 2008; Simon 2010).
Critiques of the Character and Fitness Inquiry
The character and fitness inquiry has been criticized on a variety of grounds,
including its historic use to exclude minorities from the profession and its vague and
inconsistent measurement of "good character." Indeed, "character" is an idea rooted in
the virtue ethics of philosophy-and has been rejected by behavioral psychologists
(Woolley and Stacey 2010, 170). Not surprisingly, the character and fitness inquiry has
also been criticized for the substantial costs that are associated with a screening instru-
ment that has not been rigorously assessed.
The character and fitness inquiry has been linked to the critical view of the
professionalization of lawyers (Abel 1989). Starting in the late nineteenth century, the
2. In a few jurisdictions, the official character and fitness inquiry by bar examiners begins as early as the
first year of law school. Law school applications also inquire about an applicant's character (Dzienkowski
2004). In some cases, serious misconduct may lead to denial of law school admission.
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organized bar sought to create higher barriers to entry into the profession and pushed for
increased educational, examination, and character requirements. According to critics,
the push stemmed, in part, from concerns that "undesirable" elements were becoming
lawyers and lowering the status of the legal profession (Auerbach 1976; Powell 1988).
A more formal and rigorous character inquiry was instituted in the early twentieth
century, in part, to restrict admission of immigrants who threatened the public standing
and economic stability of the legal profession (Rhode 1985; Abel 1989; Swisher 2008).
Black applicants were also disproportionately excluded on character and fitness grounds
(Rhode 1985; Abel 1989). In addition, the character inquiry was sometimes used to
deny admission to "radicals," including people who were thought to be communists
(Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners 1957; Rhode 1985; Abel 1989). It was not until the
1980s that serious efforts began to define good character and to make the inquiry fairer
to all applicants (Powell 1988; Corneille 2001).
The character and fitness inquiry has also been criticized in its recent iterations for
leading to other, less overt, negative consequences. For example, the questions about a
bar applicant's psychological history may deter law students from seeking psychological
help (Coleman and Shellow 1994; Bauer 2001). Questions about credit history may
disadvantage applicants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The focus on past
criminal conduct may perpetuate racial and class biases, as people of color and the poor
are subjected to differential treatment in the criminal justice system (Forney 2004;
Swisher 2008). Indeed, the very existence of the character and fitness inquiry may deter
some people who might have made good lawyers from applying to law school.
The inquiry has also been criticized for the arbitrary and inconsistent nature of
character determinations. Admissions authorities believe they are asking about indicia
of poor character, but these questions have never been empirically validated as measures
of this concept. Indeed, good character is not directly defined by the National Confer-
ence of Bar Examiners (NCBE), although it is manifested by a record of conduct "that
justifies the trust" of clients, the courts and others (NCBE and ABA 2013, viii). A
record revealing a notable deficiency in "honesty, trustworthiness, diligence, or reliabil-
ity" may constitute a basis for denial of admission (NCBE and ABA 2013, viii). The US
Supreme Court has stated that the inquiry should be whether "a reasonable man could
fairly find that there are substantial doubts about [the applicant's] 'honesty, fairness and
respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation' (Konigsberg v.
State Bar of California 1961). One problem, however, is that "reasonable men can readily
disagree about what conduct would raise substantial doubts" (Rhode 1985, 530).
As a practical matter, very few applicants are actually denied admission to the bar
on character and fitness grounds. Deborah Rhode's study (1985) found that only 0.2
percent of all applicants were denied admission on this basis. More recently, denial rates
appear to range from 0.14 percent to 1 percent.3 But the low denial rate may not mean
that the character inquiry is without value. Perhaps the small number of applicants who
are denied admission to the bar based on the character inquiry would have done some
3. R. David Stamm, former executive director of the Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, esti-
mated that denial rates in Connecticut were consistently one or two people (0.14 percent) per year. Denial
rates in some other states ranged from 0.18 percent to 1 percent (Missouri Board of Law Examiners 2011;
Supreme Court of Ohio and the Ohio Justice System 2012).
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very bad things if allowed to practice law. The character inquiry may also deter an
additional number of individuals who are chronic bad actors from ever seeking bar
admission.
4
The character inquiry is not, however, without significant costs. The character
review process undertaken by bar examiners is labor intensive and expensive (requiring
review of application materials for completeness and content, follow-up inquiries,
interviews, etc.). The effort to amass the required information-often spanning a
ten-year time period-is time consuming for applicants. Applicants who are required to
participate in hearings find the process exceedingly stressful and (if they hire counsel)
expensive. The process can cause embarrassment, interfere with work opportunities,
and delay employment (Bauer 2001). Critics of the inquiry have argued that it would be
better to devote resources to the investigation and discipline of wrongdoing by lawyers,
rather than to force bar applicants to undergo a time-consuming and intrusive process
(Rhode 1985). Alternatively, the regulation of law firm ethical infrastructures may
prove to be more effective deterrents to wrongdoing (Parker, Gordon, and Mark 2010)
than the character and fitness inquiry.
Even granting these critiques, a complete assessment of the character inquiry needs
to take account of the potential benefits from screening. If the data can be used to
predict future misconduct, the benefits may be significant. But if the data are not
probative of misbehavior, the practice of collecting much of the information becomes
more difficult to defend.
Deviant Lawyers: Causes and Predictors
As noted, the character inquiry has been criticized based on the absence of
evidence that it succeeds in weeding out those individuals who are likely to do harm if
they become lawyers. Commentators have also argued that the character and fitness
inquiry cannot reasonably be expected to prevent admission of potentially "problem"
lawyers because the inquiry comes too early to predict which applicants will subse-
quently misbehave (Rhode 1985). This argument has some force. Most discipline is
imposed on middle-aged lawyers (Hatamyar and Simmons 2004; Abel 2008). These
lawyers often report some depression related to work or life circumstances, alcohol
abuse, or family or financial crises (Allan 1997; Langford 2005). These problems often
arise several years after the character and fitness inquiry occurs (Benjamin et al. 1990). 5
Moreover, lawyers learn important lessons about how to behave in practice after
bar admission. The workplace is an important site where lawyers learn and construct
4. We do not know how many potentially bad lawyers do not pursue legal careers because they know
they will be denied admission due to the character and fitness inquiry. Nor do we know how often bar
authorities refuse to admit people who would have been satisfactory lawyers. This means that our assessment
of the value of the inquiry is necessarily limited.
5. It is important to note, however, that even if the proximate causes of misbehavior are not known
until after the bar application process, it may still be possible to predict subsequent discipline based on bar
application data. For example, if low grades raise the odds of being a solo practitioner, this may predictably
lead to overwork, lack of administrative resources and supervision, and depression, which can cause neglect
of client matters, even though the depression did not exist at the time of admission.
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what it means to be a professional (Nelson and Trubek 1992; Suchman 1998). These
lessons are learned from their communities of practice, that is, the "groups of lawyers
with whom practitioners interact and to whom they compare themselves and look for
common expectations and standards" (Mather, McEwen, and Maiman 2001, 6). Lawyer
behavior in practice is also significantly affected by office size and practice specialty
(Carlin 1966; Mather, McEwen, and Maiman 2001; Mather and Levin 2012). Clients'
needs and financial means influence lawyer behavior, as do the office resources available
to provide lawyers with support (Carlin 1966; Mather and McEwen 2012).
Although lawyer misconduct arises in many practice settings (Lerman 1999;
Zacharias 2001), lawyer discipline is disproportionately imposed on solo or small-firm
lawyers (Levin 2004; Abel 2008). The reasons for this are complex. These lawyers tend
to work in "personal plight" areas such as criminal law, family law, and personal injury,
where disputes are emotionally charged and clients are often vulnerable (Mather and
McEwen 2012). The discipline process may be the only recourse available for these
clients. In contrast, large-firm clients are repeat players who often have the leverage to
force firms to remedy any wrongs without resorting to the discipline process (Wilkins
1992). Moreover, much of the discipline imposed is for neglect of client matters or
failure to communicate with clients (Abel 2008; Mather and McEwen 2012). These
problems are less likely to occur in larger firms due to their ethical infrastructures
(Chambliss 2005) and are more likely to occur in solo and small firms due to insufficient
office support. The disproportionate number of solo and small-firm lawyers who are
disciplined may also reflect bias against them in the discipline system, as these lawyers
occupy the lower rungs of the lawyer status hierarchy (Levin 2004; Heinz et al. 2005).
Only one previous study has sought to explore whether there is, in fact, a rela-
tionship between applicants who disclose "problem" behaviors during the bar admis-
sions process and the subsequent imposition of discipline. Baer and Corneille (1992)
reviewed fifty-two disciplined attorneys' bar admissions files and discipline records and
compared them to the general population of all Minnesota bar applicants. They found
that disciplined lawyers were more likely to reveal evidence of certain types of conduct
in their admissions files (e.g., arrests, possible substance abuse, involuntary employment
terminations, financial problems) than other bar applicants. They also found that
lawyers who were disciplined were more likely than other lawyers to have failed the
Minnesota bar examination at least once before they passed it, but as Corneille later
noted, "the study was not conducted scientifically and involved a very small sample"
(Corneille 2001, 16).
THE STUDY DATA
General
This study looks at the admissions records of Connecticut lawyers and their
subsequent discipline history in an effort to determine whether information in the
admissions files can predict which applicants will later be disciplined. The study popu-
lation consisted of all lawyers admitted to the Connecticut bar from 1989 through 1992
(N = 6,159). These were the first four years in which the Connecticut Bar Examining
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TABLE 1.
Sample Totals by Disciplined and Never-Disciplined Lawyers
Minus Those Missing Equals: Included in
Total Sample Application Data Regression Analysis
Not disciplined 1,259 61 1,198
Disciplined 152 7 145
Total 1,411 68 1,343
Committee (CBEC) obtained credit reports and certified driving records for each
applicant as part of the character inquiry, which provided a cross-check on some of the
information supplied by the applicants. We identified all Connecticut lawyers in that
population who had ever been publicly disciplined (e.g., disbarred, suspended, publicly
reprimanded) in any US jurisdiction by searching the lawyer discipline records in
Connecticut and all other jurisdictions. We also searched for Connecticut lawyers who
had been privately disciplined in order to compile the list of disciplined lawyers (N =
152).6 We then randomly selected 1,259 lawyers7 admitted to the Connecticut bar from
1989-1992 who had never been disciplined. We subsequently excluded an additional
sixty-eight lawyers whose admissions files could not be located by the CBEC after
repeated efforts to do so. The final sample for the regression analysis totaled 1,343
lawyers (see Table 1 for sample totals).
Application data were coded directly from the CBEC's admissions files. Those
files contained the completed Connecticut bar application, recommendation forms,
employer affidavits, the dean's certificate, state motor vehicle reports, credit histories,
and other correspondence. Discipline data were coded directly from the discipline files
maintained by Connecticut's Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel and the Statewide
Grievance Commission. The discipline files typically contained the initial grievance,
the finding of probable cause that misconduct had occurred, submissions made to the
hearing panel, hearing transcripts, and the final decision imposing sanctions, although
some of this information was missing from some files. In some cases, discipline infor-
mation was also obtained from Connecticut court files and from records maintained by
other states that imposed discipline on the Connecticut lawyers in the study.
Of course, this study can analyze only the information appearing in admissions
files. While supporting documents from law schools, credit agencies, motor vehicle
departments, and so forth are included in the application file to verify portions of the
applicant's self-report, some applicants may have failed to disclose other important
6. Connecticut does not impose private discipline, but many other states do. Discussion of our efforts
to identify Connecticut lawyers who were privately disciplined in other jurisdictions appears below.
7. We based our sample size of the lawyers who had never been disciplined on the frequency of lawyers
who had been disciplined. A low frequency in the dependent variable would not render statistically
meaningful results. Long (1997) states that having approximately 10 percent of the total sample in the
dependent category is sufficient for statistical inquiry.
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information. 8 For the purposes of this study, however, an applicant's failure to disclose
does not matter, since we are only investigating whether the information that bar
admissions authorities actually obtain predicts future discipline.
Admissions Data
Our independent variables come from the information included in the CBEC's
admissions files (see Appendix Table Al for the list of variables and see Table 2 for
selected descriptive statistics). Some demographic information was not sought in the
application, such as the applicant's race and gender. By recording male or female for
obviously gendered names and checking voter registration and other records, we deter-
mined that the gender composition of the sample was 60 percent male and 40 percent
female.
Application data did include the name of the law school from which the applicant
graduated. To determine the "Rank of Law School Attended," we used data from the
1993 US News & World Report rankings as a rough measure (U.S. News & World Report
1993). The 1993 report ranked law schools individually from 1-25, and then by
quartiles for the remaining law schools. We coded law school rank as a dummy variable
(= 1 for law schools in the bottom 50 percent of rankings, 0 otherwise).'
Lawyers in our sample took several different versions of the LSAT and it is possible
that some did not take it at all.1" The Law School Admissions Council (LSAC)
recommends that LSAT scores across different iterations of the test be compared using
percentile score distributions, as "[sIcores cannot be converted from one scale to
another in a fashion that would permit confidence that the converted score has the
same meaning as scores originating on the scale to which the conversion is made" (Law
Services 1991, 21). We used percentile data from LSAC to estimate a percentile score
for each applicant who reported taking the LSAT.
Discipline Data
Our dependent variable in the analysis is whether or not a lawyer was disciplined
between the time of bar admission in Connecticut and 2010. We recognize that
8. For example, psychological history is difficult to ascertain without self-disclosure. In addition, in
Connecticut, criminal records were not routinely searched by the CBEC from 1989-1992, so criminal
convictions that were not revealed by applicants may not have come to the attention of the CBEC. Each
applicant did, however, sign a consent form authorizing the CBEC to obtain a variety of records concerning
the applicant, including criminal records. Thus, it is likely that most applicants self-disclosed convictions on
the theory that it was preferable to do so rather than to face additional difficulties in the application process
due to lack of candor.
9. In analyses not shown, we also coded law schools by separating schools into the top 10, 11-25, the
remainder of the first quartile, and the second, third, and fourth quartiles. For this article, we selected one
variable for law school rank in order to present a more parsimonious model. For analyses with a more detailed
breakdown of law school rank, see Levin, Zozula, and Siegelman (2013).
10. The LSAT was first administered in 1948-1949 and was not widely adopted until the 1960s. Some
of the lawyers in the sample who were admitted to the Connecticut bar during 1989-1992 had attended
law school and been admitted in other jurisdictions before the widespread use of the LSAT. For a fuller
description of how the LSAT scores were coded, see Levin, Zozula, and Siegelman (2013).
Character and Fitness Inquiry 59
TABLE 2.
Frequencies of Selected Variables for Total Sample
Total Sample
Percentage Mean N Total N
Female 40.00 540 1,350
Application Data
Prior Encounters with the Bar
Prior application 7.53 101 1,342
Prior discipline 0.37 5 1,342
Academic History
Law school ranked in bottom 50% 39.15 525 1,341
LSAT score (percentiles) 65.87 1,209 1,209
Credit History
Nonstudent loan debt 22.74 1,326 1,326
Student loan debt 13.16 1,328 1,328
Delinquent accounts 8.96 119 1,328
Bankruptcies 0.30 4 1,338
Civil, Criminal, & Traffic Measures
Criminal conviction 2.46 33 1,340
Ever have traffic violation 53.45 712 1,332
Number of traffic violations 1.01 1,273 1,273
Driver's license suspensions 6.21 83 1,337
Litigation alleging fraud 0.67 9 1,340
Civil litigation 14.58 195 1,337
Health
Substance abuse 0.97 13 1,343
Mental or emotional disorder 2.16 29 1,343
Total N = 1,350; application data N = 1,343.
discipline is an imperfect proxy for misconduct for a variety of reasons. First, much
lawyer misconduct is never detected, reported, or sanctioned through formal channels
(Wilkins 1992; Levin 2004). The imposition of disciplinary sanctions also potentially
confounds the behavior of at least three separate actors: a lawyer (whose behavior
generates a complaint); a complainant (who decides whether to file a grievance); and
the bar's disciplinary authorities (who decide whether to impose sanctions). Neverthe-
less, other methods of measuring lawyer misconduct-for instance, looking at griev-
ances filed or probable cause determinations-are even more problematic. Both are
virtually impossible to obtain from out-of-state authorities. Moreover, grievances often
do not reflect any misconduct by a lawyer-it is not uncommon to find grievances filed
against lawyers by disgruntled clients who are unhappy with the bill or the result.
Probable cause determinations by the disciplinary authorities are also poor measures
of lawyer misconduct because the standard for finding probable cause is low and the
findings are often made simply because a lawyer fails to respond to a grievance.
Another problem with the use of disciplinary sanctions as the dependent variable
arises from jurisdictional variations in sanctioning. Every state and the District of
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Columbia has a lawyer discipline system that can impose sanctions on those admitted
to their bar and 75 percent of the lawyers in the sample were admitted to the bar of at
least one jurisdiction in addition to Connecticut. All jurisdictions impose public dis-
cipline in the form of disbarments and suspensions, and some form of public reprimand
for less serious misconduct; many also impose conditions such as probation or continu-
ing legal education (e.g., an ethics or law office management course). Private discipline
can be imposed for "minor" misconduct in most jurisdictions, although Connecticut
and a handful of other jurisdictions do not impose private sanctions." Thus, disciplinary
sanctions do not have equivalent meanings in each jurisdiction and they are imposed
by decision makers working within different systems who apply somewhat different
standards.
Moreover, information about private discipline is often impossible to obtain.12 We
searched publicly available lawyer discipline databases and contacted out-of-state dis-
ciplinary authorities in order to identify each lawyer admitted in Connecticut from
1989-1992 who was disciplined in any US jurisdiction. In some cases, authorities
informed us if any of the lawyers in our sample who were also admitted in their
jurisdictions had been privately disciplined there. Occasionally, we also found descrip-
tions of private discipline imposed on a lawyer in public documents. In many cases,
however, we were unable to determine whether a lawyer in our sample who was
admitted in another jurisdiction had been privately disciplined by that jurisdiction.13
Ultimately, we believe that in spite of these limitations, bar discipline identifies
much of the most serious misconduct, including lawyers who steal from clients and those
who are convicted of serious crimes. The imposition of discipline is thus at least a crude
measure of whether a lawyer has departed from the standards of professional conduct
expected of members of the bar and it is the only measure that is readily available.
ANALYSIS
Description of Disciplined Lawyers
Lawyers may be professionally disciplined for misconduct in connection with their
duties as lawyers. They may also be disciplined for criminal or other behavior that may
or may not be directly related to their work, but is deemed unacceptable for someone in
a position of civic trust. The disciplined lawyers in the sample primarily were disciplined
for professional rule violations involving the failure to communicate with clients
11. As of 2009, eleven other jurisdictions did not impose private discipline sanctions, including the
District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, and New Jersey (ABA 2010, Chart II). Nevertheless, most
of them imposed private discipline for at least some period from 1989-2009.
12. In addition, some states also have diversion programs, which permit lawyers who commit minor
misconduct to avoid disciplinary sanctions by complying with certain requirements, such as attending a law
office management course. This information is also private and only a few jurisdictions would confirm that
the Connecticut lawyers also admitted to the bar in their states had not been subject to diversion.
13. While missing data are always a legitimate concern, our best estimate is that if all private discipline
were known, the true discipline rate in our sample would be 10.4 percent instead of 10.3 percent. See Levin,
Zozula, and Siegelman (2013, Appendix B) for a detailed analysis.
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TABLE 3.
Disciplined Lawyers, by Severity
Number % of Total
Less severely disciplined 94 61.84
Severely disciplined 58 38.16
Total 152 100.00
(20 percent), lack of diligence (17.9 percent), and the failure to properly safeguard
client property (11.3 percent).14 In addition, twenty-eight lawyers received sanctions
because they were convicted of crimes, ranging from conspiracy to commit murder to
lesser crimes such as driving under the influence, though some of these lawyers also
received sanctions for independent incidents of misconduct.
After looking at disciplined lawyers as a single group, we also broke the disciplined
lawyers into two categories: severely disciplined and less severely disciplined. "Severely
disciplined" lawyers were those who, after admission to the Connecticut bar, were
suspended for two or more years, disbarred, or resigned and waived the right to reapply
in response to charges of serious misconduct. This group also includes (1) lawyers whose
misconduct resulted in interim suspensions of indeterminate length due to serious
misconduct that probably would have resulted in severe discipline and (2) lawyers who
were placed on inactive/disability status after engaging in serious misconduct that
otherwise probably would have resulted in severe discipline. "Less severely disciplined"
lawyers received lower-level sanctions, including shorter suspensions, reprimands, and
conditions such as probation. Table 3 breaks down the disciplined lawyers by severity of
discipline imposed. As explained below, the two types of sanctions appear to track
distinct types of misbehavior and are in turn predicted by different variables.
For those who were disciplined, the average length of time between admission and
the filing of a grievance leading to a sanction was 10.7 years. At the time the grievance
complaint was filed, most of the lawyers were working in solo or small (two- or
three-lawyer) law firms. In fact, only eight of the disciplined lawyers practiced in firms
with more than ten lawyers and only two of those lawyers practiced in large firms (over
fifty lawyers). 5 Most of the lawyers (72.4 percent) were disciplined only once and the
majority of those lawyers (56.9 percent) received no greater sanction than a public
reprimand.
Differences Between the Disciplined and Never-Disciplined Lawyers
Figure 1 presents a broad overview of the differences between the disciplined and
never-disciplined lawyer samples for selected variables. Three conclusions are apparent.
14. For a more detailed discussion of the rule violations, see Levin, Zozula, and Siegelman (2013).
15. It was not always possible to determine whether lawyers were working in solo firms or whether they
had one or two other lawyers working with them. To make that determination, we relied on transcripts and
other materials in the disciplinary files.
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Gender Rank of Law School
Never-Disciplined Disciplined Never-Disciplined Disciplined
[l Male 0 Bottom 50%
P Female Top 50%
Driver's License Suspension Traffic Violations
Never-Disciplined Disciplined Never-Disciplined Disciplined
* Driver's License Suspension [ Traffic Violations
* No Driver's License Suspension Fi No Traffic Violations
Criminal Conviction Delinquent Accounts
Never-Disciplined Disciplined Never-Disciplined Disciplined
[ Criminal Conviction El Delinquent Accounts
[ No Criminal Conviction r :No Delinquent Accounts
Mental or Emotional Disorders Substance Abuse
Never-Disciplined Disciplined Never-Disciplined Disciplined
.\ ...... ."..\..... .. ... .
l Mental or Emotional Disorder . Substance Abuse
No Mental or Emotional Disorder No Substance Abuse
FIGURE 1.
Differences Between Never-Disciplined and Disciplined Lawyers
First, at the time of application, there are some sharp contrasts between the group
of lawyers who were subsequently subject to discipline and those who were not, along
many dimensions.
Second, these differences are largely in line with intuitions about factors that
would predict future discipline. For example, as Figure 1 indicates, while 16.6 percent of
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the disciplined lawyers were female, 42.7 percent of those in the never-disciplined
sample were women. The overrepresentation of men among the disciplined lawyers is
consistent with studies of lawyers in other jurisdictions (Curtis and Kaufman 2003-
2004; Hatamyar and Simmons 2004; Bartlett 2008) and with the sociology of deviance
more generally. Similarly, lawyers who were subsequently disciplined were more than
twice as likely to report having had a preapplication psychological diagnosis/treatment
as those who were not (4.1 percent vs. 1.9 percent). Fifty-nine percent of the disciplined
group attended a law school ranked in the bottom half, compared to 36.8 percent of the
lawyers who were not disciplined. Disciplined lawyers were also more than twice as
likely to report having had a preapplication criminal conviction (5.6 percent vs. 2.1
percent), having had their driver's license suspended (13.1 percent vs. 5.4 percent), and
having had delinquent credit accounts (23.8 percent vs. 7.2 percent). Thus, at the time
of application to the bar, subsequently disciplined lawyers were manifestly "worse" on a
variety of measures of socially disfavored variables.
Third, Figure 1 reveals that while some of the predictor variables differ strongly
across the two groups, their absolute levels are mostly quite low. For example, even
though disciplined lawyers are more than twice as likely to have had their driver's
license suspended as never-disciplined lawyers, the overall prevalence of license sus-
pensions (6.21 percent) is still very small in absolute terms. The implication is that the
data do not provide a very powerful basis for predicting the likelihood of future
discipline, a theme to which we return in the Discussion section below.
Of course, not every variable is more strongly associated with the disciplined
group. For instance, none of the disciplined lawyers reported bankruptcy on their
applications, as compared to four of the never-disciplined lawyers (results not shown).
Also, the rate of substance dependency/treatment does not significantly vary between
the disciplined and never-disciplined groups.
In sum, the comparisons in Figure 1 demonstrate that there are some differences
between the never-disciplined and disciplined groups across specific variables. The
comparisons do not tell us, however, how significant these differences are for predicting
the likelihood of discipline and they only consider each variable individually, without
controlling for the effects of other variables. For that, we turn to regression analysis.
Logistic Regression Analysis
We use logistic regression analysis to assess the effects of the independent or
explanatory variables (measured at the time a lawyer is admitted to the bar) on the
probability that he or she will subsequently be disciplined, controlling for all other
independent variables included in the regression. Table 4 presents our basic models
predicting the probability of discipline. The coefficients in these logistic regressions are
marginal effects that capture the change in the probability of discipline from a one-unit
change in the independent variable of interest.16 The regressions are weighted to reflect
16. Since the regression is nonlinear, the coefficients are not constant: Coefficients on continuous
variables are evaluated at their sample average value, while coefficients for dummy variables measure the
effect of moving from X = 0 to X = 1. By way of comparison, an ordinary least squares regression (linear
probability model) produced largely similar results, with an R2 coefficient of only 0.037.
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TABLE 4.
Logistic Regression Predicting Both Types
Specification
of Discipline; Marginal Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Character Variables
Prior discipline
Discipline, academic deficiency
Discipline, other
Negative feedback, dean's certificate
Negative feedback, letters
Work discipline
Default on student loan
Judgment against by creditor
Delinquent accounts
Bankruptcies
Nonstudent loan debt
Student loan debt
Criminal convictions
Traffic violations, number
Driver's license suspensions
Civil litigation
Litigation alleging fraud
Substance abuse
Mental or emotional disorder
Demographic Variables
Age
Female
1989
1990
-2.8800
(6.9680)
.0001
(0.0084)
-0.0029
(0.0206)
-0.0241
(0.0237)
-0.0012
(0.0111)
0.0046
(0.0066)
0.0057
(0.0107)
0.0035
(0.0141)
0.0273***
(0.0064)
2.9270
(6.9680)
.0000*
(.0000)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
0.0109
(0.0142)
0.0040***
(0.0015)
0.00624
(0.0080)
0.0135**
(0.0056)
-0.0113
(0.0340)
-0.0053
(0.0256)
0.0222*
(0.0122)
0.0003
(0.0003)
-0.0246***
(0.0041)
-0.0049
(0.0058)
-0.0027
(0.0059)
0.4930
(7.2540)
-0.0104
(0.0090)
0.0026
(0.0203)
-0.0322
(0.0240)
-0.0048
(0.0107)
0.0058
(0.0067)
0.0077
(0.0120)
-0.0032
(0.0143)
0.0251***
(0.0069)
-0.455
(7.2540)
.0000
(.0000)
0.0004***
(0.0001)
0.0125
(0.0130)
0.0028*
(0.0015)
0.0013
(0.0087)
0.0146**
(0.0057)
-0.00873
(0.0367)
-0.0081
(0.0225)
0.0334**
(0.0134)
0.0001
(0.0004)
-0.0249***
(0.0042)
-0.0029
(0.0064)
-0.0019
(0.0064)
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TABLE 4.
(Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
1991 -0.0017 -0.0023
(0.0060) (0.0063)
Prior application 0.0089 0.0124
(0.0078) (0.0079)
Waived in 
-0.0053 -0.0060
(0.0095) (0.0106)
Armed services 0.0016 0.0019
(0.0089) (0.0094)
Law school ranked bottom 50% 0.0177*** 0.0170***
(0.0059) (0.0059)
Class rank 
-0.0103 -0.0094
(0.0130) (0.0139)
Average grade 
-0.0064*** -0.0049**
(0.0020) (0.0020)
LSAT (percentile) 0.0074 0.0061
(0.0150) (0.0155)
N 1,343 1,343 1,343
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parentheses. Missing mean substitution. All
variables held at mean. Coefficients are marginal effects that measure the change in likelihood of discipline
given a one unit change in the independent variable.
the fact that we have application data for all but seven of the disciplined lawyers
admitted from 1989 to 1992 and a random sample of roughly 20 percent of the
never-disciplined lawyers. A useful starting point is the observation that the baseline
probability of discipline (with no controls) is roughly 150/6,200, or 2.4 percent. Missing
data in these logistic regression analyses are treated with mean substitution. Only 2.97
percent of the observations were missing.17
Model 1 of Table 4 includes only variables that seem directly related to an assess-
ment of "character," narrowly defined. These include the presence of disciplinary action
in college or law school, negative feedback on the dean's certificate and references,
termination from employment, a poor credit history, traffic offenses, involvement in
criminal and civil litigation, and reported mental health and substance abuse problems.
We deliberately exclude "background" or "demographic" variables such as gender and
rank of law school attended that-while they may be predictive of discipline risk-are
not themselves relevant to an assessment of "character. 8 By way of overview, Model 1
17. We chose mean substitution so that we did not need to drop any observations and because we were
missing less than 3 percent of our observations. We also ran regression analyses dropping missing cases and
using mean substitution for disciplined lawyers and never-disciplined lawyers. See Levin, Zozula, and
Siegelman (2013, Appendix Tables 4-5.2).
18. The distinction between "character" and "demographic" variables admittedly is not clear cut, but
we adopt an expansive definition of which variables measure "character" so as to give character variables the
greatest possible chance to explain subsequent discipline.
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is not particularly useful at predicting future discipline risk; the variables that best track
"character" are mostly not statistically significant and those that are have fairly low
effect sizes.
Some credit history variables are associated with an increased likelihood of disci-
pline. For example, each additional thousand dollars of student debt raises the prob-
ability of discipline by 0.04 percentage points and this result is highly significant (p <
.01). In the case of nonstudent debt, however, the effect size is negligible. 9 Having
delinquent credit accounts increases the likelihood of discipline by about 2.73 percent-
age points, and the effect is statistically significant (p < .01).
Prior involvement with the criminal or civil justice system raises the chances that
an applicant will be disciplined after admission, but for most variables, the effects are
small and are not well-measured. Having a prior criminal conviction is associated with
a roughly 1.09 percentage points greater chance of discipline, though the effect is not
statistically significant. Having been a party to a civil suit (as either plaintiff or defen-
dant), raises the discipline probability by 1.35 percentage points, and this effect is
moderately significant (p < .05).20 Traffic violations are associated with a higher disci-
pline risk, with each additional violation adding about 0.4 percentage points to the
likelihood of discipline. This effect is statistically significant (p < .01).
Finally, substance dependency or treatment does not raise the probability of dis-
cipline, but reported diagnosis of or treatment for psychological disorders is associated
with higher discipline risk. The effect is large-about 2.2 percentage points-and
weakly significant (p < .10). But it remains true that someone with a record of mental
health diagnosis/treatment is still overwhelmingly unlikely to be disciplined: The base-
line probability of discipline for someone with no reported mental health diagnosis/
treatment is only about 2.5 percent, so having such history only raises the probability of
discipline to about 5 percent, holding all other variables constant.
In sum, Model 1 of Table 4 shows that while some character variables are predic-
tive of future lawyer discipline, most have very low effect sizes. In Model 2, we look at
the predictive effect of "background variables" including, age, year of application,
military service, and academic history on the likelihood of discipline.
Consistent with the social deviance and criminology literature (Covington and
Bloom 2003; Simon and Ahn-Redding 2005), gender has a statistically significant effect
on the probability of being disciplined: being male raises the probability of discipline by
approximately 2.5 percentage points. Put another way, women have a 1 percent chance
of being disciplined, while men have about a 3.5 percent chance, all else equal. The
effect is statistically significant (p < .01). On the other hand, at 3.5 percent, the
probability of discipline is still very low in absolute terms. Other background
variables-in particular, the year of application/cohort variables-are mostly very small
in magnitude and insignificant. Thus, there are no obvious time-related trends in the
19. Nonstudent debt is presumably largely mortgage debt. Without knowing more, it is difficult to say
whether a larger mortgage is indicative of financial stress or simply a higher level of income.
20. Civil litigation in these models excludes divorce proceedings. We also ran a model that controlled
for whether or not a lawyer had been divorced at the time of application (table not shown). The effect of
divorce was not statistically significant and did not notably alter the effect of any other variables in the
regression model.
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likelihood of discipline and no cohort of applicants significantly or substantively differs
in the likelihood of discipline from the others.
We also included academic performance measures in Model 2 of Table 4, as we
believe performance on the LSAT, prestige of law school, and performance while in law
school are predictive of career trajectory. Generally speaking, lawyers who perform less
well on these measures are more likely to work in solo or small firms (Heinz et al. 2005),
where discipline is more likely to be imposed. Among the academic history variables,
attendance at a more prestigious law school is associated with a reduction in the
probability of discipline. Those who graduate from the bottom half of law schools have
a 1.7 percentage points higher chance of discipline than those who graduate from the
top 50 percent of law schools. Higher law school grades and class rank in law school are
both negatively associated with discipline risk, but the effect is only statistically signifi-
cant for grades (p < .01).21 Controlling for class rank and law school grades, LSAT score
has essentially no effect on the likelihood of discipline.
We now turn to a model that includes all variables-both those that are related
directly to character and fitness and those that are largely sociodemographic. Model 3
of Table 4 allows us to see the effect of "character" variables after controlling for the
effects of demographic and academic performance variables. We find that the "charac-
ter" variables that predicted the likelihood of discipline in Model 1 continue to do so,
with fairly consistent effect sizes and statistical significance. Combining "character" and
"demographic" variables in Model 3, we find that being a woman and having higher law
school grades reduce the likelihood of discipline, which is consistent with Model 2.
Having attended a less prestigious law school, having delinquent credit accounts, and
having higher student loan debt are associated with an increased risk of discipline.
Likewise, having a number of traffic violations, having been a party to civil litigation
(excluding divorce), and having been diagnosed with or treated for a psychological
disorder are also associated with an increased risk of discipline.
The only notable changes in effects in Model 3 of Table 4 are bankruptcy and
diagnosis/treatment for a psychological disorder. Having had a previous bankruptcy now
dramatically lowers the risk of future discipline, which is to be expected given that all
those in the sample who experienced a bankruptcy were in the never-disciplined group.
We also find that controlling for background variables actually increases the effect size
and statistical significance of diagnosis of or treatment for a mental or emotional
disorder. In Model 3, having been diagnosed with or treated for a psychological disorder
increases the likelihood of discipline by 3.3 percent (p < .05).
Predictions and Goodness of Fit
Our regression analyses show the predictive power of single variables on the
likelihood of discipline. Yet bar examining authorities evaluate the totality of an
21. In alternative specifications (not reported) we used only one of LSAT score, law school GPA, and
class rank to check for multicollinearity. When GPA and LSAT score are dropped, class rank becomes a
statistically significant negative predictor of discipline risk (p < .05). LSAT score is never significant, even
when the other measures are excluded.
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TABLE 5.
"Hits" and "Misses" for In-Sample Predictions of Discipline Based on Model 3
of Table 4
Predicted
Not Disciplined Disciplined Total
Not Disciplined 1,198 0 1,198
row % 100.00% 0.00% 100.00%
column % 89.34% 0.00% 89.20%
Disciplined 143 2 145
row % 98.62% 1.38% 100.00%
column % 10.66% 100.00% 10.80%
Total 1,341 2 1,343
row % 99.85% 0.15% 100.00%
column % 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
applicant's file: a single misdemeanor conviction might not be enough to raise red flags,
yet someone with a misdemeanor conviction, multiple traffic violations, and law school
discipline might be judged to lack good character.
Can the information gathered by bar authorities, when used in a statistically
optimal way, allow for accurate predictions of who will subsequently receive discipline?
To address that question, Table 5 shows the "hits" and "misses" associated with a simple
prediction rule derived from the baseline specification in Model 3 of Table 4.22 For each
observation, we obtain a predicted probability of discipline by feeding the values of all
the explanatory variables for that observation into the estimated regression equation.
Any observation for which the model estimates a probability of discipline greater than
50 percent is treated as a prediction of discipline; those observations for which the
predicted probability of discipline is less than 50 percent are treated as predictions of no
discipline. We are then in a position to ask how accurately the model predicts who will
be disciplined and who will not. "Hits" are defined as correct predictions (either of
discipline or no discipline); "misses" are incorrect predictions. Table 5 provides subto-
tals by row (row %), indicating how many of those with a given actual outcome were
(correctly) predicted to have that outcome and how many were (incorrectly) predicted
not to have it. It also provides subtotals by column (column %), indicating how many
of those with a given predicted outcome actually had that outcome.
23
Since such a small fraction of applicants is subsequently disciplined, the most naive
plausible model would predict no discipline for anyone. That model would correctly
22. We also ran the predicted probabilities using Model 1 of Table 4. We had the same predictions as
reported in Table 5: a correct prediction of 100 percent of the never-disciplined lawyers and a correct
prediction of 1.38 percent of the disciplined lawyers.
23. That is, for the first row, reading across: of the 1,198 total observations in our sample who did not
receive discipline, the model correctly predicted 1,198 (100 percent) of them. For the first column, reading
down (in italics): Of the 1,341 total observations that our model predicted would not receive discipline,
1,198 (89.34 percent) did not in fact receive discipline, while 143 (10.66 percent) did.
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predict 100 percent of the 1,198 never-disciplined lawyers (Row 1 of Table 5), but
would fail to predict any of the 145 actual instances of discipline in Row 2. The nafve
model, however, makes for an obvious baseline against which to compare the predictive
accuracy (goodness of fit) of our specification. As it turns out, our results do not provide
much of an improvement over that baseline. As does the nafve model, our Model 3
correctly predicts 100 percent of the 1,198 never-disciplined lawyers. But we correctly
predict only two (1.38 percent) of the 145 disciplined lawyers. In other words, when we
use all the available character information in a statistically rigorous fashion, the payoff
is only two more correct predictions for who will be disciplined than would be achieved
through the nafve model that predicts no discipline for anyone.
24
Another caution is in order. The model was estimated using a sample of roughly
one-fifth of the never-disciplined lawyers and all those lawyers whose discipline we
were able to uncover.25 This means that even if the model were applied to the entire
population of admitted lawyers, there would be no more truly disciplined lawyers "left"
to predict. It is possible that fitting the model to the entire population might (incor-
rectly) predict discipline for some of the never-disciplined lawyers who were not in our
sample; but a larger sample of the never-disciplined lawyers cannot possibly increase the
number of correct predictions of discipline, so our model represents the upper bound in
terms of predicting who will be disciplined.
Figure 2 provides another way to understand the very modest predictive power of
the admissions data. The figure plots the total number of applicants for each predicted
probability of discipline, as well as the number who were actually disciplined. Impor-
tantly, 1,274 applicants (including 115 of the 145 who were subsequently disciplined)
had predicted discipline probabilities that were less than 10 percent, and are not shown
in the figure. Of the 68 applicants with predicted discipline probabilities greater than 10
percent, only thirty (43 percent) were actually disciplined. There are three clear outliers
(with predicted probabilities of 43, 61, and 73 percent), but most of the applicants are
clustered in the 10-20 percent range, and only fifteen applicants had predicted prob-
abilities above 20 percent. The figure makes it quite clear that there is no significant
group of high-risk applicants who stand out from the rest of their peers.
Differences Between Severely, Less Severely, and Never-Disciplined Lawyers
The analysis thus far assumes that all discipline is identical and that the appropriate
distinction to be drawn is between the disciplined and the never-disciplined lawyers. But
there may be good reasons to distinguish between different types of discipline. Predicting
which lawyers will be disbarred for stealing client funds is not necessarily the same thing
24. One could also frame these issues in a different way: of the 1,341 predictions of no-discipline made
by our model, 89.34 percent (1,198) are correct. However, there are 143 instances of discipline that we miss
(false negatives). The model's two predictions of discipline are also correct, so there are no false positives.
Of course, this accuracy comes at a cost of failing to predict almost all of those who will receive discipline,
and again represents virtually no improvement over the nafve baseline model.
25. We dropped seven disciplined lawyers with missing application files and we may be missing some
private discipline for those lawyers who were also admitted in states that make use of it. That said, we have
the complete set of all lawyers whose disciplinary status can be known with certainty.
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as predicting which lawyers will be subject to censure for minor record-keeping viola-
tions. In this section, we briefly present evidence on differences between the severely and
less severely disciplined lawyers. We then use multinomial regression techniques to test
whether the factors that predict severe discipline also predict less severe discipline.
When we divide our sample by the severity of discipline imposed, a surprising
result emerges: the severely disciplined group looks somewhat more like the never-
disciplined group than like the lawyers who were less severely disciplined. In other
words, the explanatory variables are more strongly associated with less severe discipline
than with severe discipline.
The severely disciplined lawyers were academically somewhat stronger than those
who were less severely disciplined. For example, 63.7 percent of the less severely
disciplined lawyers attended a law school ranked in the bottom half as opposed to 51.8
percent of the severely disciplined lawyers. About 11 percent of the severely disciplined
lawyers failed the Connecticut bar exam at least once before being admitted, but that
figure rises to just under 17 percent for the less severely disciplined group (results not
shown) (see Levin, Zozula, and Siegelman 2013).
Roughly the same pattern emerges for nonacademic variables. The less severely
disciplined group had more lawyers with delinquent credit accounts, 26.4 percent, as
compared to 19.6 percent of the severely disciplined lawyers, and 7.2 percent of the
never-disciplined group. Perhaps surprisingly, there were no reported instances of
mental health diagnosis/treatment or substance dependency/treatment among those
applicants who later received severe discipline. The less severely disciplined group was
the only disciplined group to reveal mental health (6.7 percent) and substance depen-
dency (2 percent) issues.
However, the severely disciplined group does differ from the less severely disciplined
group on certain variables we would associate with a greater likelihood of discipline.
Women were a smaller share of the severely disciplined than of the less severely
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disciplined group (12.5 percent vs. 19.1 percent). The severely disciplined group had a
higher rate of criminal convictions (7.1 percent vs. 4.6 percent) and driver's license
suspensions (17.9 percent vs. 10.1 percent). Both groups reported more convictions and
license suspensions than those who were never disciplined (compare Figures 1 and 3).
We now seek to answer two questions: First, what explains each type of discipline
and, second, are these factors the same across the two discipline types? We use multi-
nomial logistic regression, in which the dependent variable can take on one of three
possible outcomes: no discipline (Y = 0), less severe discipline (Y = 1), and severe
discipline (Y = 2).26 The coefficients estimated from this regression give the probability
of moving from the baseline condition (no discipline) to either of the other two states,
so there are thus two coefficients for each explanatory variable. 27 The coefficients are
estimated jointly via maximum likelihood methods. We then test for whether the
estimated coefficients predicting less severe discipline are the same as those predicting
severe discipline, which is equivalent to asking whether we are justified in using a single
logistic equation to explain both types simultaneously or whether we need a separate
equation for each discipline type.
Disaggregating by severity of discipline (Table 6) reveals some interesting similari-
ties and differences from earlier models that treated all discipline as homogenous. Being
female still has a large and statistically significant (negative) effect on the likelihood of
both severe and less severe discipline, just as it did in the earlier regressions that
combined these two types of discipline. But some effects do differ once we disaggregate.
Having experienced prior discipline (as a lawyer in another state before applying to the
Connecticut bar) had an insignificant effect on the likelihood of discipline in most of
the logistic models of Table 4. Prior bar discipline continues to have no effect on the
probability of receiving less severe discipline in Table 6; but, surprisingly, it appears to
reduce the likelihood of receiving severe discipline (p < 0.01), as shown in Column 2.
In Table 4, we saw that attending a lower-ranked law school was associated with an
increased likelihood of discipline overall, but once we disaggregate, law school rank
retains its explanatory power only for less severe discipline-the prestige of the law
school attended has no effect on the likelihood of receiving severe discipline. Higher
law school grades reduce the likelihood of less severe discipline, but have no effect on
severe discipline.
Perhaps the most significant finding in Table 6 is the difference that a reported
preapplication mental health diagnosis/treatment makes for the likelihood of receiving
the two types of discipline. Consistent with our earlier findings, having had a mental
health diagnosis/treatment history significantly raises the probability that an applicant
will receive less severe discipline. However, it actually lowers the likelihood of receiving
severe discipline, by a large and significant amount. A similar pattern emerges for
26. We recognize that the model sacrifices some statistical power by ignoring the fact that the choices
are ordered: less severe discipline is obviously "less severe" than "severe" discipline, but the (unordered)
multinomial model does not make use of this information. We were unable to discover an econometric test
for pooling in an ordered multinomial model, however, so we use the unordered version instead.
27. In other words, given variables indexed by i = 1,..., k, and disciplinary status indexed by 1 or 2,
P, represents the effect of a one unit change in explanatory variable i (say, amount of debt) on the
probability of receiving discipline of type I (say, less severe). 3.2 represents the effect of a one unit change
in that same explanatory variable on the probability of receiving discipline of type 2.
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FIGURE 3.
Differences Between Less Severely Disciplined and Severely Disciplined Lawyers
substance dependency/treatment and for bankruptcy: both significantly lower the risk of
severe discipline but have no effect on less severe discipline.
We observe differential effects for several other variables as well. Student debt, the
number of traffic violations, and being a party to civil litigation are positively correlated
with less severe discipline, but not with severe discipline. Having a criminal conviction
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TABLE 6.
Multinomial Logistic Regression Simultaneously
Predicting Both Types of Discipline; Marginal Effects
Specification
Less Severely Severely
Disciplined Disciplined
Character Variables
Prior Discipline 0.2900 -26.4400***
(4.3920) (4.6220)
Discipline, Academic Deficiency -0.0032 -0.0073
(0.0062) (0.0060)
Discipline, Other -0.0581*** 0.0085
(0.0176) (0.0086)
Negative Feedback, Dean's 0.2310*** -8.1390***
Certificate (0.0684) (1.2310)
Negative Feedback, Letters -0.0002 -0.0057
(0.0070) (0.0077)
Work Discipline 0.0032 0.0020
(0.0047) (0.0041)
Default on Student Loan 0.0059 -0.0011
(0.0080) (0.0071)
Judgment Against by Creditor 0.0006 -0.0052
(0.0091) (0.0100)
Delinquent Accounts 0.0164*** 0.0068*
(0.0048) (0.0036)
Bankruptcies 1.6390 -36.0800***
(4.347) (6.2990)
Non-Student Loan Debt .0000 .0000
(.0000) (.0000)
Student Loan Debt 0.0002*** 0.0001"*
(.0001) (.0001)
Criminal Convictions -0.0003 0.0113*
(0.0102) (0.0060)
Traffic Violations, Number 0.0018* 0.0007
(0.0010) (0.0009)
Driver's License Suspensions -0.0069 0.0079*
(0.0063) (0.0047)
Civil Litigation 0.0109*** 0.0031
(0.0040) (0.0040)
Character Variables, continued
Litigation Alleging Fraud 0.4400*** -14.2600***
(0.1260) (2.38700)
Substance Abuse 0.0083 -0.1850***
(0.0144) (0.0264)
Mental or Emotional Disorder 0.159*** -4.3900***
(0.0432) (0.8410)
Demographic Variables
Age .0001 .0000
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Female -0.0127*** -0.0102***
(0.0030) (0.0023)
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TABLE 6.
(Continued)
Less Severely Severely
Disciplined Disciplined
1989
1990
1991
Prior Application
Waived In
Armed Services
Law School Ranked Bottom
50%
Class Rank
Average Grade
LSAT (percentile)
N
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses.
Missing mean substitution. All variables held at mean. Coefficients are
marginal effects which measure the change in likelihood of discipline
given a one unit change in the independent variable.
at the time of application is weakly associated with a greater risk of severe discipline, but
does not change the probability of receiving less severe discipline.
It is difficult to see a pattern or explanation for these differential effects. Even if we
cannot explain them, however, we can formally test whether the results of Table 6 are
consistent with using a single discipline measure (as in Table 4) or whether we need to
use separate equations for each of the two discipline types (as in Table 6). To do so, we
use a test for pooling in multinomial logit models." The basic logic of this test is simple.
If severe and less severe discipline respond similarly to the independent variables, there
is little or nothing to be "lost" by combining the two into a single dependent variable
("discipline"). On the other hand, if the regression performs significantly less well as a
single logistic regression than it does when we disaggregate by discipline type, then
aggregation is rejected by the data. We find-using the standard Wald test-that
pooling is strongly rejected. 9 This implies that, overall, the two types of discipline are
28. The technique was devised by Jan Cramer and Geert Ridder (1991) and the method is described
in their article.
29. The test statistic is 46s) with a value of 4516.56, for a p value of 0.00.
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sufficiently different in the ways they respond to the independent variables that we are
not justified in combining them into a single measure.
DISCUSSION
The results presented above demonstrate that some factors known to the bar
authorities at the time a bar candidate applies for admission are robustly associated with
a greater chance that the applicant will go on to be disciplined. But three important
qualifications are required.
First, variables such as gender are statistically significant and do have a "large"
effect on the probability of discipline. Nevertheless, the baseline probability of disci-
pline is so low that even something that doubles this probability-say, from 3 percent
to 6 percent-does not provide much predictive leverage. Policy makers would almost
certainly not be advised to take significant action based on a predicted probability of
future discipline as low as 6 percent. Thus, even though we can be confident that men
are substantially more likely to be disciplined than women (controlling for other
observable factors), this knowledge is not very useful in making admissions decisions.
The same logic applies for all the other statistically significant effects we found.
Second, our model suggests that there are at least two distinct types of discipline
(severe and less severe), and that they respond differently to many of the independent
variables we considered. Variables such as substance dependency, the number of
traffic violations, criminal convictions, and having had a preapplication psychological
diagnosis/treatment have differential effects on the risk of receiving severe and less
severe discipline. Although the bar examining committee may seek to prevent all types
of lawyer misconduct, distinguishing between lawyers who receive less severe and more
severe discipline may be a useful way to think about allocating resources.
Finally, the analysis presented so far has focused exclusively on prediction, without
any attempt to elucidate the causal mechanisms linking the explanatory variables and
the imposition of discipline. Given the limitations of the available data, we believe this
focus is unavoidable. Nevertheless, we think it is worth hypothesizing about the possible
causal mechanisms at play.
Some Possible Causal Explanations
Why do the explanatory variables predict either kind of discipline? We find that
many of the variables that are associated with increased discipline risk are demographic
variables rather than measures of "character."3 The finding that male bar applicants
were significantly more likely to be disciplined than female applicants replicates similar
findings in the United States, Canada, and Australia (Arnold 1998; Curtis and
30. This result is in accord with what social psychologists, following Ross (1977), describe as the
"fundamental attribution error." Lay persons tend to ascribe an individual's behavior to robust, situation-
invariant character traits, whereas research in social psychology lays much more emphasis on context and
setting as explanations for behavior.
76 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
Kaufman 2003-2004; Haller and Green 2008) and is consistent with a large body of
evidence about deviance generally. This finding is interesting because women are more
likely to work in solo practices than men (Carson 2012, 10) and are more likely to
experience depression (Hagan and Kay 2007). Thus, other things being equal, women
should be more susceptible to grievances and discipline. The reasons for the gender
differences are unclear. It is possible that women are more conscientious than men
(Schmitt 2008), which might mean that they are less likely to be subject to discipline.
It may be that women are more risk averse than men (Byrnes et al. 1999) and are less
likely to take moral risks for money (Fumham and Okamura 1999). Female lawyers who
work in firms may have less contact with clients than their male counterparts, which
may present fewer opportunities for them to be grieved by clients (Bartlett 2008). It is
also possible that female lawyers are more conciliatory when clients become dissatisfied,
making women less likely to be the subject of grievances. Alternatively, women may be
more cooperative with disciplinary authorities than men (Hatamyar and Simmons
2004, 828) and thus less likely to engage in some of the behaviors (e.g., verbal attacks
on disciplinary authorities, refusals to admit wrongdoing, etc.) that result in sanctions
that could have been avoided (Abel 2008).
One possible explanation for the gender difference in discipline that our data do
not seem to support is that women were less likely to continue in the practice of law
than were men. If men have more years of exposure to discipline risk than women, they
will be more likely to experience discipline at some point, even if the annual discipline
risk is the same for both genders. In fact, however, our data show that on average,
women practiced only two fewer months than men. This slight difference is too small
to explain the observed gender difference in likelihood of discipline. We cannot dis-
count the possibility, however, that some women were not working full time, which
would lower their exposure to discipline risk.31
We argue that academic performance variables, such as law school prestige and law
school grades, predict discipline risk, at least in part, through career trajectory. Other
studies have shown that lawyers who graduate from top-tier schools and who do well in
law school are more likely to go to large firms, while lawyers who graduate from
lower-tier schools and those with lower grades are more likely to work in solo and small
firm practice (Zemans and Rosenblum 1981; Abel 1989; Heinz et al. 2005; Dinovitzer
et al. 2009). Solo and small-firm lawyers are more likely to be disciplined and lawyers in
such settings are often disciplined for relatively low-level acts of omission (e.g., neglect
of client matters, failure to return phone calls) that may be due to inadequate office
support. By contrast, more serious misconduct, such as theft of client funds or other
crimes, occurs both in solo firms and in more elite practice settings (Lerman 1999). This
explanation is consistent with our findings linking rank of law school and law school
grades to less severe discipline, but not to severe discipline. Academic measures such as
rank of law school attended and law school grades, then, may be predicting discipline
"indirectly," via their link to practice setting.
31. We measured length of practice by looking at how long a lawyer remained registered as an "active"
member of any bar. Some women (and some men) might have retained "active" status when not practicing
full time or when not actually practicing at all, so the two-month figure may underestimate the true
difference in career length.
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The results indicating that bar applicants with delinquent credit accounts or
with higher student debt load are more likely to be subject to discipline may have a
similar explanation. It may be that delinquent account holders have problems man-
aging their paperwork or may not take their legal obligations seriously." If so, it is
easy to imagine how such traits might lead to misconduct and subsequent discipline.
An alternative explanation, however, is that bar applicants with delinquent credit
accounts and higher debt may come from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. We
know, for example, that graduates of elite law schools are more likely to come from
higher socioeconomic backgrounds and to work in the largest firms (Heinz et al.
2005). These individuals may also need to incur less student debt than other appli-
cants in order to attend college and law school.33 Therefore, credit measures may also
be predictive of discipline through the intervening variables of career trajectory and
firm size.
The finding that those who reported a mental health diagnosis or treatment on
their bar applications were more likely to be disciplined must be interpreted with
caution. The types of diagnoses that applicants revealed were primarily anxiety disor-
ders or depression associated with a stressful life event (e.g., divorce, death of a loved
one). Only twenty-nine lawyers in the sample reported any prior diagnosis of a psycho-
logical disorder and/or treatment at the time of bar application, which is well below
what would be expected in that population (Temple 2012). Those who experienced a
psychological problem and failed to report it may have done so for reasons related to the
likelihood of future discipline. For example, suppose the "nonreporters" were the least
"truthful" among all those who experienced mental health problems and would thus
be more likely than the "reporters" to experience future discipline. In that case, the
coefficient that measures the effect of reporting a mental health diagnosis/treatment
would understate the true effects of a mental health problem on the likelihood of future
discipline. On the other hand, perhaps the "nonreporters" were those who experienced
the mildest mental health problems, which might make them less likely than the
reporters to be disciplined in the future. In that case, the true effect of experiencing a
mental health problem on future discipline would be smaller than actually measured in
the regression. The key point is that depending on the reasons for underreporting, the
measured coefficient could be either too large or too small, and both possibilities are
plausible.
Six of the twenty-nine lawyers who reported mental health diagnosis/treatment
were subsequently disciplined (all less severely), although none of them indicated on
their bar applications that their psychiatric condition was serious (e.g., involved
a hospitalization). Moreover, five of the six disciplined lawyers incurred only one
32. We also looked at the possibility that higher nonstudent or student debt is linked to financial
misconduct as a lawyer. This might be true if those with higher amounts of debt face greater financial
pressures that lead them to steal money from clients or engage in other money-related misconduct. In fact,
however, we found that debt levels were less predictive of discipline for money-related misconduct than of
discipline generally, so there is no evidence of this financial pressure effect.
33. In other analyses (results not shown), we tested if the amount of student loan debt affected the
likelihood of discipline differentially by rank of law school attended. The effect was very small in magnitude
and not statistically significant. The inclusion of the interaction term did not alter the coefficients or
significance of student debt and law school rank.
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disciplinary sanction and it was a reprimand. None of these five claimed that their prior
psychological problems contributed to the conduct that led to discipline, although two
referred to other stressors in their lives during the discipline proceedings (e.g., family or
personal illnesses). Five of the six disciplined lawyers who revealed mental health
diagnosis/treatment on their bar applications did not receive the grievance leading to
discipline until more than ten years after admission. In other words, the data suggest
that a reported history of mental health diagnosis/treatment on the bar application
predicts, at best, low-level misconduct that is unlikely to occur until more than a decade
after the applicant enters practice.
Additional Caveats
A few final caveats are in order. This study is small and is limited to a single state
that is positioned between two major metropolitan areas. As a result, a majority of the
lawyers in the study were also admitted in other jurisdictions and many practiced
outside of Connecticut, so the group may not be representative of lawyers in other
jurisdictions. Moreover, while we feel confident that we located all public discipline
imposed on the lawyers admitted to the Connecticut bar from 1989-1992, it is possible
that we failed to learn about out-of-state private discipline imposed on one or more
lawyers for minor misconduct. (For an explanation of why we think this does not pose
significant problems for interpreting our results, see Levin, Zozula, and Siegelman 2013,
Appendix B.)
In addition, we only tracked admitted lawyers for seventeen to twenty years from
the date of their admission to the Connecticut bar. If we had tracked all of these lawyers
until the end of their careers, we might have obtained somewhat different results.
Finally, this study necessarily only relied on information that was reported to the
CBEC when it made its admissions decision and as a result, the information may
not fully reflect an applicant's true history. Although some of this information could
be cross-verified (e.g., through dean's certificates, traffic records, and credit reports),
it may be that lawyers who were disciplined were less likely to self-report certain
problem history. For example, applicants with a history of hard-to-discover
problems-such as substance abuse-may not have revealed this information on the
bar application. Thus, the study only reflects the predictive value of the information
that is disclosed to the bar examiners, and not the predictive value of applicants' true
personal histories.
CONCLUSION
The information collected during the character and fitness inquiry does not appear
to be very useful in predicting subsequent lawyer discipline. The reason is that the
baseline likelihood of discipline among admitted lawyers is so low (about 2.5 percent of
the lawyers in our cohort). Thus, even something-such as being male-that doubles
the likelihood of subsequent disciplinary action only raises the probability of discipline
to 5 percent. It seems unlikely that a regulator would deny admission to an applicant
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who had only a 5 percent chance of subsequent discipline, especially when the disci-
pline would likely be a single reprimand. To meet even a modest "more-likely-than-not"
standard, one would need to identify a set of variables that together raise the risk of
discipline by a factor of twenty. In the data and models we examined, only two
individuals were predicted to have a better than even chance of being disciplined, a
finding that casts serious doubt on the usefulness of the character and fitness inquiry as
a predictor of lawyer misconduct.
This preliminary study raises a number of questions for further research. First, and
most obviously, there is the question of whether the study's findings can be replicated in
other jurisdictions. It is also important to determine whether the results remain the
same if the discipline histories of lawyers are traced for more than twenty years.
Demographic variables that may have an impact on the likelihood of lawyer
discipline-such as socioeconomic status and race-should be incorporated into the
analysis (although their use in admissions decisions would raise serious equal protection
problems). The significance of debt burden may merit special inquiry. It will also be
important to look at whether the effects we observed are maintained when controlling
for practice setting, which we could not do in this analysis, but that would be feasible
with a longitudinal panel study. Of course, information such as practice setting is
not available to committees at the time an admission decision is made; but this
post-admission information would be useful in sorting out whether the effects of back-
ground variables on discipline are mediated through the setting in which a lawyer
practices.
If the predictive value of the information obtained during the character and fitness
inquiry is low, are there other good reasons to continue the requirement? As previously
noted, protection of the public is the primary justification for the inquiry and it is
possible that the mere existence of the process discourages certain bad actors from ever
applying to law school. However, it may also deter those with a history of relatively
minor misconduct, with a disparate impact on racial and ethnic minorities. The extent
to which this actually occurs needs to be explored.
The character and fitness inquiry may also serve symbolic functions. It could assure
the public that there are safeguards on who becomes a lawyer, thus promoting public
trust in the profession. The inquiry may also serve as a socialization process for new
lawyers, signaling that they are expected to display "good character" throughout their
careers, for example, by avoiding substance dependency or criminal judgments. These
symbolic capacities of the character and fitness inquiry might be important enough to
justify the continued use of at least some of the questions, despite their predictive
infirmities. While our study cannot speak to the symbolic importance of the character
and fitness inquiry, it would be useful to evaluate the public's and bar applicants'
attitudes toward the requirement, rather than simply assume that these symbolic func-
tions are worth the time and energy devoted to the character and fitness inquiry.
Should the character and fitness inquiry be continued in its current form? Too
many other questions remain open to answer that one at this time. Nevertheless, it is
not too soon to ask serious questions about the narrow range of permissible actions that
regulatory authorities can take in response to the information in candidates' admission
files. As it now stands, authorities must choose from an extremely limited menu of
responses to an individual's application: they can deny admission altogether-
80 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
something they almost never do-or they can admit the applicant. Some states also
grant conditional admission, which permits monitoring of certain applicants for a
relatively short time.3 4 This response may be misguided if, as the data suggest, the initial
grievance leading to discipline is, on average, not filed until a lawyer has been in
practice for more than ten years.
Future work should consider the possibility of other alternatives. Even if we cannot
accurately distinguish lawyers who will subsequently experience discipline from those
who will not, it might be appropriate for admissions authorities to impose some kind of
additional requirements on applicants with a statistically elevated risk of future disci-
pline. For example, someone with an elevated discipline risk (say, a 20 percent chance
of future discipline) might be required to maintain malpractice insurance as a condition
of admission or might be required to take a course in law office management if he or she
ever practices in a solo or small firm. Lawyers with an elevated risk of severe discipline
might be subject to random audits of client trust accounts. Even though it is difficult to
predict which applicants will later be sanctioned, there might be room to impose some
prudential requirements on those applicants who pose a higher-than-average risk of
future discipline.
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